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The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of 
indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the 
development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the 
rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by 
the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of 
"mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The 
bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, 
that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the paper is to present three alternative explanations for the post-1980 boom of 
noncooperative game theory. In previous works (see e.g. Giocoli 2003, Chs.4-6) I have explained 
how game theory as such1 failed to receive a significant degree of attention by economists2 in the 
first two decades after its “invention” by John von Neumann and John F. Nash, namely, the 1950s 
and 1960s. The simple question then is: how could it happen that a neglected sub-discipline 
managed in about a decade to conquer the “hearts and minds” of economists, eventually becoming 
the undisputed theoretical core of mainstream economics?3 It is quite immediate to surmise that, if 
we accept 1980 (or, better, as will be detailed below, the last third of the 1970s) as the starting date 
for the rise of game theory, the events which sparked it must have taken place in the previous 
decade or so, namely, during the 1970s. 
What I offer here are three explanations of the rise:4 
 
- the beginning of the literature on the refinements of Nash equilibrium 
- the reaction against Chicago antitrust theory and policy 
- the application of game-theoretic tools to mechanism design problems. 
                                                 
*
 E-mail: giocoli@mail.jus.unipi.it I thank Michele Boldrin for having stimulated this research and for his useful 
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1
 Not so game theory as a tool-box of useful analytical techniques: see Giocoli 2003a 
2
 Not so by mathematicians: see e.g. Owen 1982. 
3
 Here the publication of Kreps 1990 may be taken as iconic of such a conquer: see also below, §4. 
4
 The list is far from exhaustive as other, surely relevant explanations might be added, such as the definitive 
abandonment of the cooperative approach in favour of the noncooperative one (see e.g. Schotter and Schwödiauer 
1980) or the increasing mathematical literacy of average economists. I have dealt extensively with these issues in 
Giocoli 2003; 2009.  
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In my fore-mentioned works I have more or less explicitly argued for the first explanation, crediting 
the boom of game theory to the huge amount of research spent on chasing ever more refined 
characterizations of strategic rationality and game solutions. This literature originated from the 
pioneering work of 1994 Nobelists John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten who, in the second half of 
the 1960s, extended noncooperative theory to deal with, and actually solve, games of incomplete or 
imperfect information. In this paper I wish to go beyond this account: my main thesis is that what 
really caused the boom was the powerful combination between the refinements literature and the 
two other explanations. Indeed, it might even be argued that most of the former emerged just out of 
necessity, in order to tackle the concrete antitrust and mechanism design issues raised by the latter.  
What goes totally untackled in the paper is a further concern which, as I argue below, is 
nonetheless crucial for a full reconstruction of the postwar history of game and decision theory. 
How, when and why did the idea that rational agents should be modeled as Bayesian decision-
makers become, first, an accepted, and, later, the standard assumption in economic theory? Here I 
have no answer yet, but in the concluding § I will advance the suggestion that a promising research 
line goes in the direction of investigating the kind of decision theory which was being taught during 
the 1960s in top US business and management schools. Anyway, in what follows I will simply take 
for granted that a game theorist working in the second half of the 1970s was perfectly comfortable 
with the assumption of Bayesian decision theory as the kind of rationality to be attributed to players 
in a noncooperative setting. 
 
 
2. The refinements literature and Harsanyi’s contribution  
 
The most straightforward explanation of the 1980s triumph of game theory may be found in the so-
called refinements literature. By this name it is meant the description of how the standard definition 
of a Nash equilibrium in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from 
decision theory (Govindan and Wilson 2007, 1). The origin of this stream of research dates back to 
the 1950s, that is, immediately after John Nash had developed his solution concept for 
noncooperative games. It did not take long, in fact, for game theorists (including Nash himself: see 
Giocoli 2003, Ch.5; 2004) to raise those very issues which still lie at the roots of the refinements 
literature, viz., the problems of multiplicity, equilibrium selection and rational behavior under 
incomplete information. Take for instance Luce and Raiffa’s 1957 classic. Within their overall 
negative evaluation of Nash equilibrium (see ibid., 104-5, 112), the authors put particular emphasis 
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on the circumstance that the standard, fixed-point argument in favor of Nash’s solution – namely, 
that of being an equilibrium notion with the property that knowledge of the theory supporting it 
would not lead any player to a choice different from that dictated by the theory itself – characterizes 
it as just a necessary condition of rational strategic behavior, but not a sufficient one. Multiplicity of 
equilibria in normal form games is widespread, so much so that, absent a convincing theory of how 
to select among them, Luce and Raiffa had to conclude that <<… [Nash] equilibrium notion does 
not serve in general as a guide to action.>> (ibid., 172).  
Luce and Raiffa also realized that the normal form, while providing a general, and quite user-
friendly, tool for modeling strategic situations, entailed the suppression of all information issues. 
Indeed, in the normal form no player can get any private information until after she has chosen her 
strategy for the whole game, that is, until there is nothing left she can do apart from mechanically 
implementing the strategy itself (see Myerson 2004, 3). This of course falls short of being a proper 
representation of strategic behavior in dynamic situations, that is, in all games where a player is 
called to act repeatedly, and thus can draw inferences about the other players’ strategies, 
preferences or private information as the game proceeds. Normal form Nash equilibria simply do 
not distinguish between the case in which each player commits initially and irrevocably to her 
strategy throughout the game, and the case in which a player continually re-optimizes as the game 
goes on. The distinction is lost because the definition of Nash equilibrium presumes that players 
will surely adhere to their initially chosen strategies. As Govindan and Wilson (2007, 3-4) put it,  
 
<<Most refinements of Nash equilibrium are intended to resurrect this important distinction. Ideally one would like 
each Nash equilibrium to bear a label telling whether it assumes implicit commitment or relies on incredible threats or 
promises. Such features are usually evident in the equilibria of trivially simple games, but in more complicated games 
they must be identified augmenting the definition of Nash equilibrium with additional criteria.>>.  
 
Remarkably, Luce and Raiffa did try to modify the standard definition of a game by allowing 
players to have incomplete information, and thus to hold beliefs rather than knowledge, about the 
strategic situation (see Luce and Raiffa 1957, §12.4). Unfortunately, their complicated technique led 
nowhere.  
Despite the early discovery of the limits of Nash equilibrium, we can safely date the real 
beginning of the refinements literature to Selten 1965. In that paper Selten explicitly raised the issue 
of the adequacy of the normal form, and of the related necessity to investigate more carefully the 
extensive form, as the central questions of noncooperative game theory.5 This opened large, 
                                                 
5
 On Selten’s paper see Myerson 1999, 1076. 
 4 
uncharted prairies along two research lines.6 On the one side, Selten’s acknowledged the all-too-
frequent case of games whose normal form representation had too many Nash equilibria, some of 
which seemed clearly irrational when the game was examined in extensive form in that they 
required an agent to play a strategy she would refuse to play if actually called to. This forced the 
imposition of stronger necessary and sufficient conditions for rational strategic behavior in 
extensive form games – stronger, that is to say, than Nash’s necessary condition for the normal 
form. As is well known, Selten’s answer to the problem of excluding intuitively unreasonable Nash 
equilibria was the new notion of subgame perfect equilibrium, but this was just the first entry in 
what in the next couple of decades became a long list of ever more refined equilibrium concepts.7 
On the other side, at the root of Selten’s 1965 puzzle lay the intuitively appealing idea that 
extensive form games sharing the same normal form should have the same set of solutions. Hence, 
further refinements of Nash equilibrium have been developed which may be directly applied to 
games in normal form.8 These refinements enjoy the property that the solution theory based upon 
them, when applied to the extensive form, guarantees that extensive form games sharing the same 
normal form representation will have the same solutions. 
Many refinements have been proposed.9 Generally speaking, each contribution to this literature 
starts with a list of the properties which appear theoretically desirable for a refinement concept to 
enjoy. Especially in the literature’s early years, the dream was to find the “magic bullet”, i.e., the 
solution concept capable of solving all games, be they in normal or extensive form. While this 
dream – which was just a revised version of von Neumann’s original goal of providing a complete 
characterization of rational strategic behavior (see von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953, 31) – was 
quickly abandoned, the search strategy followed by game theorists entailed that the refinements 
were mostly developed incrementally, one after the other, and often relying on ad hoc criteria.  
Two major groups of refinements can be identified (see Govindan  and Wilson 2007). The first 
consists of those equilibrium notions which require sequential rationality as the game progresses.10 
The other includes the notions which warrant the credibility of the equilibrium by considering 
perturbed games where every contingency – even very unlikely ones – occurs with positive 
probability. Thus, while refinements in the first group exclude unreasonable equilibrium by 
imposing a stronger notion of rationality upon the players, those in the second accept that players 
may make “mistakes”, thereby making no equilibrium truly unreasonable.   
                                                 
6
 Note that the distinction is made here just for expository reasons, since the two lines have never been really separated. 
7
 Another landmark notion worth mentioning here is the sequential equilibrium in Kreps and Wilson 1982. 
8
 See Myerson 1991, 215. 
9
 To mention a very rough datum, a simple Google scholar search for the expressions “refinements of Nash 
equilibrium” and “Nash equilibrium refinements” delivers about 400 hits. 
10
 A strategy is sequentially rational for player i at information state s if i would actually want to do what this strategy 
specifies for him at s when information state s actually occurred. 
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Yet, even the ultimate and most sophisticated refinement may still allow for multiple equilibria in 
many games (the most obvious example being the well-known Battle of the Sexes). This explains 
why, following Myerson (1991, 241-2), it is correct to distinguish between true refinements on the 
one side – namely, solution concepts intended to offer a more accurate characterization of rational 
behavior in games – and selection criteria on the other. The latter are any objective standard which 
can be used to determine the focal equilibrium expected by every player to occur in case of 
multiplicity. Note that a selection criterion, differing from a refinement, requires more than the 
players’ rationality. What is also called for is, in Myerson’s terminology, a “cultural” feature of the 
players’ environment capable of inducing them to focus on a specific selection criterion, so much so 
that if players, on account of the common cultural feature, expect each other to behave according to 
one of the equilibria, then they may rationally fulfill these expectations.  
The twin goals of refining the Nash equilibrium and selecting among several equilibria, fueled by 
the two theoretical drivers of eliminating unreasonable equilibria and ensuring the consistency of a 
game’s solutions in normal and extensive form, constituted a powerful mix for the rise of game 
theory. Historians have explained how, starting from the postwar period, economics has detached 
itself from its old role model, mechanical physics, and has replaced it with a new one, mathematics. 
Indeed, neoclassical economics in the second half of the 20th century has increasingly resembled 
mathematics in terms of methodology (read, the axiomatic approach) and, above all, of the 
discipline’s sociology, namely, of things such as: how Ph.D. students are selected and taught, what 
is considered a relevant contribution, how scientific progress is defined, and so on and so forth (see 
Weintraub 2002; Giocoli 2009). The refinements literature fits perfectly in such a picture, so much 
so that until very recently I would have unreservedly embraced these two statements: i) the boom of 
game theory in the late 1970s – early 1980s has been due to the flow of contributions on the 
refinements literature; ii) this literature has come into existence because ever more economists have 
applied their ever increasing mathematical skills11 to a math-style, problem-solving setup, namely, 
that of providing a new theorem showing how a given solution concept might be either generalized 
or turned into another, more refined one. 
Yet, I now recognize that the limit of an explanation based on these statements is that it is too 
“internal” to the subdiscipline of game theory and so it downplays the extent of the revolution 
brought to the broader realm of economics by the other founding paper of the refinements literature, 
namely, Harsanyi’s landmark analysis of games with imperfect information, published in three parts 
in Management Science (Harsanyi 1967-68). The content and the import of Harsanyi’s paper have 
                                                 
11
 Rizvi 1994 highlights how a role in this story might have been played by the inflow into game theory of the gifted 
mathematical economists who, precisely in the same period, were abandoning general equilibrium theory due to the 
negative implications of the SMD theorem.  
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been masterfully reconstructed by Roger Myerson in various papers (see Myerson 1999, 2001, 
2004, 2008). Here I just wish to highlight a few features.  
First of all, note that Harsanyi’s motivation also stemmed from the limitations of the Nash 
equilibrium for normal form games. As I said before, a game in normal form assumes that all 
players have the same information, or, as Myerson effectively puts it, that <<the “beginning of the 
game” must be a point in time when all players have the same information.>> (Myerson 1999, 
1076). Yet, this restriction is unacceptable when we have to model situations where agents have 
some, long-standing differences in information, because <<…it demands that our model must begin 
with some point from the distant past.>> (ibid.). Harsanyi 1967-68 showed how to avoid this 
difficulty by constructing a Bayesian game of incomplete information.  
A (consistent) Bayesian game is one where the players’ different beliefs at the beginning of the 
game are due to their having observed different random variables about which all players have 
common prior beliefs. This entails that, thanks to Harsanyi, it is not necessary anymore to impose 
ad hoc informational differences whenever the analysis of real world phenomena requires them, 
because these differences can themselves be explained in terms of the heterogeneity of players’ 
experiences. In other words, while in a Bayesian game, the game model itself is assumed to be 
common knowledge among players, we do not need to assume anymore that players have the same 
information.  
The players’ different information is described by a collection of random variables, called the 
players’ types, each of which is private information of one player. The actual value of each players’ 
type is omitted from the model, which instead includes a probabilistic description of what each type 
of each player believes about the other players’ types.12 This corresponds to a very peculiar 
modeling strategy, because the perspective from which Harsanyi’s games are analyzed is that of 
someone who only knows the information common to all players, i.e., the information summarized 
by the game model itself. Hence, the Harsanyian analyst is asked to deny herself the possibility to 
exploit any knowledge of any player’s actual type: such an information, being a private one, must 
be treated as a random variable because this the only way the analyst may correctly appreciate the 
uncertainty of the other players who do not know it and can only formulate beliefs about it. These 
beliefs are said to be consistent if the players’ type-contingent beliefs can all be derived by Bayes’s 
rule from the fore-mentioned common prior distribution.  
                                                 
12
 More specifically, a Bayesian game is a mathematical model that specifies: 1) the set of players, 2) the set of feasible 
actions for each player, 3) the set of possibly types for each player, 4) each player’s expected payoffs for every possible 
combination of all players’ actions and types, 5) for each possible type of each player, a probability distribution over the 
other players’ possible types describing what each type of each players would believe about the others’ type (see 
Myerson 2008, 4). 
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The second remarkable feature refers to the actual circumstances of the early presentation of 
Harsanyi’s paper (see Aumann and Maschler 1995; Myerson 2004). This took place at a 1965 game 
theory conference in Jerusalem, where the audience included people like Robert Aumann, Michael 
Maschler and Reinherd Selten. The three, together with Harsanyi, spent the following years 
working together in a research project of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 
Problems of information in games became a central focus of ACDA, where Harsanyi found the 
proper environment to refine, and spread, his ideas. These events help explain why Bayesian games 
found immediate application in the refinements literature, so much so that they quickly became the 
latter’s most essential tool. For example, Harsanyi 1973 offered a new interpretation of mixed-
strategy equilibria, filling a gap as old as game theory itself: by letting each player have some minor 
private information which changes the payoffs only slightly, any mixed-strategy equilibrium of a 
normal form game could be transformed into a non-randomized equilibrium of a Bayesian game, 
where each type chooses an optimal action without randomization (Myerson 1999, 1077; 2008, 5). 
Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that, absent Harsanyi 1967-68, very little of the 
refinements literature would exist in its present form. Just think of the analytical possibilities 
opened by the interpretation of  an extensive form game as a Bayesian game: any action in the latter 
may be represented as a plan describing what the player would do in any situation after the 
beginning of the game as a function of what the player may learn during the play, so much so that a 
player’s strategy becomes a function that specifies a feasible action for each other player’s possible 
types. Or think of Kreps and Wilson’s 1982 sequential equilibrium, arguably the most fundamental 
solution concept for extensive form games, which explicitly requires that each player’s system of 
beliefs be consistent with the game structure.  
It would be tempting to constrain Harsanyi’s work entirely within the boundaries of the 
refinements literature. This would obviously strengthen the above-mentioned “internalist” 
explanation of game theory’s boom. However, the importance of the 1967-68 paper far exceeds 
those boundaries, as it is apparent if we pay attention to the fact that what Harsanyi gave us was no 
less than a general methodology, a standard analytical framework, for the modeling of situations 
where economic agents have different information – a kind of situation which is ubiquitous in the 
real world and which lies at the foundation of the whole of information economics. Such a broader 
view of Harsanyi’s contribution goes a long way into explaining the reasons behind the modern rise 
of game theory. The clearest supporter of this interpretation is again Roger Myerson. So we may 
well give him the final word in this section:   
 
<< [Harsanyi’s] influence has been the basis for a profound revolution in social science. Any academic discipline must 
rely on a general methodology to provide a framework for inquiry and debate. […] After Harsanyi’s (1967-8) great 
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study of incomplete information, Vickrey’s auction games, Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons, and Spence’s (1973) 
labor markets, and Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) insurance markets could all be viewed as interesting examples of 
people playing Harsanyi’s Bayesian games. Having this common framework of such informational problems enabled us 
to apply insights from the study of any one of them to all the others, and thus the new economics of information was 
born.>> (Myerson 2004, 18).  
 
 
3. The reaction against Chicago antitrust13 
 
It is rather well known that the 1930s marked a watershed in industrial economics. On the one side, 
the first general models of imperfect and monopolistic competition were proposed; on the other, the 
new structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach was developed in Edward Mason’s Harvard 
seminar.14 The SCP approach – which predicted anticompetitive outcomes as the inevitable 
consequence of non-perfectly competitive market structures – was to dominate industrial economics 
from the late 1930s to the early 1970s. Remarkably, these were also the years of active antitrust 
enforcement by the US Supreme Court and the Department of Justice. Following more than a 
decade of relative neglect of antitrust, the Supreme Court effectively revitalized the Sherman Act 
via the introduction of new per se prohibitions in rulings such as Interstate Circuit (1939) and 
Socony Vacuum (1940).15 Exactly as dictated by the SCP approach, the focus in antitrust law shifted 
from conduct to market structure, while typical SCP notions like market shares and the various 
indexes of concentration became the basic tools of judicial analysis. The zenith of SCP-style 
antitrust enforcement came in the 1960s. Three key rulings – Brown Shoe (1962), Philadelphia 
National Bank (1963), Von’s Grocery (1966) – testified the Supreme Court’s turn towards 
structuralism: at the heart of the Court’s evaluation in all these cases were market shares, their 
history and future, as well as their effect on market structure.  
Thus, starting from the mid-1930s and for more than thirty years, a remarkable and increasing 
consistency existed on competition matters between judicial decisions and conventional economic 
thinking.16 Such an almost perfect overlap helped open and support the era of aggressive contrast 
against monopolization and restraints of trade which lasted until the 1970s. Yet, as it had already 
happened before (see Martin 2007), the antitrust pendulum was to swing back. A reaction against 
the excesses of structuralism inevitably came, and it came from the Chicago school of economics.  
The Chicago counterrevolution in antitrust has been founded on four pillars. First of all, a 
theoretical pillar, the so-called tight prior equilibrium, or “good approximation”, hypothesis (Reder 
                                                 
13
 The first part of this § follows Giocoli 2010. 
14
 Mason 1939 is traditionally considered the manifesto of the SCP approach. 
15
 See Martin 2007. 
16
 See Kovacic and Shapiro 2000, 51-52 
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1982), that is to say, the idea that any economic system exhibits a spontaneous tendency to reach a 
situation of Pareto-optimal equilibrium provided it is not disturbed by exogenous interferences, like 
those by government, antitrust authorities or courts. Secondly, an empirical pillar. According to 
Chicago economists, the data and observations used to found and validate the SCP approach were 
simply wrong: for example, the structuralist claim that the causation went from the number of firms 
in a market to the amount of profits each firm could earn had actually to be reversed since only the 
most efficient, i.e., most profitable, firms were those capable of surviving competition. The third 
pillar had to do with the viewpoint from which to evaluate competition and explain business 
conduct. Given that Pareto-optimality was the “natural” situation of markets (see the first pillar), 
efficiency explanations of business behavior had to be privileged with respect to market power ones. 
Two corollaries followed. First, the focus of antitrust analysis should be on market performance, as 
well as on the conduct determining it, while the structuralist viewpoint had to be abandoned. 
Second, the measure of market performance had to be consumer welfare (<<…the only legitimate 
goal of antitrust…>> in the words of Bork 1978, 7). The fourth and final pillar was pragmatic, but 
perhaps even more important than the previous three. I refer to the special ability of Chicago 
scholars to translate their economic arguments into operational principles that courts and lawyers 
might easily understand and apply.17  
The combination of the four pillars proved irresistible. Starting from the early 1970s, and 
reaching their maximum influence about a decade later, Chicago antitrust arguments conquered US 
courts and, eventually, the Supreme Court. The landmark event is unanimously considered the 1977 
GTE Sylvania ruling,18 when the Court rigorously applied a Chicago-style economic argument to 
overrule the per se prohibition of restrictive distribution practices and bring non-price vertical 
restraints back to the rule-of-reason realm. The general lesson of GTE Sylvania was simple, but 
epoch-making: reliance on competition (read: a competitive market structure) to deliver good 
market performance had to be abandoned and replaced, in general, by a case-by-case evaluation of 
the net welfare impact of every single business practice, and, in particular, by an efficiency 
assessment of allegedly anti-competitive behaviors. Many other rulings, covering the other areas of 
antitrust, from collusion to dominance, from mergers to predatory pricing, followed and 
consolidated this crucial principle. The focus on efficiency explanations made much more difficult 
for antitrust authorities to win a case involving, say, vertical restraints or monopolization. Less than 
a decade after Sylvania, Chicago economists could be satisfied with their achievement: several 
                                                 
17
 On the crucial role of legal scholars as intermediaries for the application of economists’ insights to legal problems in 
terms that courts can readily comprehend, see Kovacic 1992, 297.  
18
 Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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business conducts had been declared per se legal, while a case-by-case evaluation was warranted 
for almost all the remaining types of behavior.  
It is crucial for our story to realize that, exactly when the Chicago approach made its 
breakthrough, by convincing ever more US courts of the validity of the economic arguments 
supporting pro-competitive explanations of several, supposedly anti-competitive, business conducts  
– exactly then, a series of new results in industrial economics seemed to prove the contrary, namely, 
that there could well be an anti-competitive rationale behind these very same conducts! 
Remarkably, these results were all based on the application of game-theoretic tools to models of 
imperfect competition. And the kind of game-theory employed in these models was that developed 
in the 1970s by Harsanyi, Selten and all the other scholars of the refinements literature. The 
coincidence is so impressing that it seems reasonable to argue that, at least as far as industrial 
economics is concerned, and regardless of their ability to “sell” their ideas to legal scholars and 
courts, the Chicago economists’ approach has never been dominant or mainstream. Indeed, since 
the early 1980s, the advent and quick rise to dominance in industrial economics of game-theoretic 
methods has set the record straight in the marketplace of ideas, so much so that it is now customary 
to speak of a post-Chicago approach to competition issues.  
Now, the question is: may we apply a post hoc, propter hoc logic and thus conclude that the 
boom of game theory has been caused, or induced, by the necessity to counter, in academic circles, 
as well as in courts, the Chicago attack against active antitrust enforcement? Let me exemplify this 
viewpoint by referring to the case of predatory pricing. By this expression it is meant, generally 
speaking, the case of a firm which sets prices at a level implying the sacrifice of profits in the short-
run in order to eliminate competition and get higher profits in the long run.19 Hence, the two basic 
elements of predatory behavior are the existence of short-term loss, on the one side, and the 
existence of market power enabling the predator to raise prices in the long run and recoup the losses 
suffered during the predatory phase, on the other. The standard account of predatory behavior 
satisfies these two requirements. It is the so-called deep pocket story: a big firm may drive its small 
rivals out of business by exploiting its ability (due, for instance, to the extra profits earned in other 
markets) to survive for a significant period of time the losses originating from a below-cost (viz., 
predatory) price, while small firms have no such ability and are thus forced to eventually give up. 
While this story sounds quite convincing,20 a robust theory supporting it has been proposed only in 
the 1980s, by Benoit 1984. But, and here is the key point, Benoit’s paper, as well as several others 
providing a rationale for predatory behavior, all stem from Harsanyi’s formalization of games with 
incomplete information. 
                                                 
19
 Motta 2004, 412. The following paragraphs closely follow Motta’s exposition of predatory pricing (ibid., §7.2). 
20
 This also was the Supreme Court’s opinion: see e.g. Utah Pie vs. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).  
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Predatory behavior has always been quite hard to assess. Indeed, the basic difficulty is implicit in 
its definition: how can a court distinguish low prices due to genuine competitive behavior from low 
prices due to the willingness to eliminate competition? This problem explains why, starting from 
the 1960s, the predation story became an easy target for the harsh criticism of Chicago scholars, 
who obviously denied that the observation of a “low” price charged by a firm endowed with market 
power might ever lead to an accusation of predatory behavior. The attack began with McGee 1958. 
In that paper, various critiques were raised against the standard story. The two most important ones 
were, first, that the small firm, with a “small pocket”, may well obtain funds from the financial 
market, thereby resisting against the predation, and, second, that it is far from clear that predatory 
behavior is the most profitable one for the big firm, given that there may well exist alternative, more 
profitable strategies (say, a merger).  
McGee’s paper, which fully reflected the Chicago view of antitrust, has had an enormous impact 
in the application of the School’s approach to antitrust cases. In the words of McGee’s 1980 
reassessment of his earlier contribution, the key point is that <<… if they are to be broadly 
applicable, theories of business behavior should concentrate on policies that pay.>> (McGee 1980, 
295). In the case of predatory pricing his argument proved that this was not the case, that is, that 
there were no serious reasons to assume that the predator’s total future gains – i.e., the motivation 
behind predation itself – could ever exceed the short term loss caused by the predatory strategy. 
McGee’s conclusion was that predatory pricing, if it ever existed, was quite rare and, thus, 
undeserving of the attention, and the resources, of competition authorities. Doing otherwise would 
imply a high number of “false positives”, i.e., of wrong condemnations as predatory of simple price 
rebates, that is, of the first and foremost instance of competing behavior. 
During the 1960s and 1970s various proposals came from SCP quarters in order to rescue the 
predation case from McGee’s critiques. These attempts were characterized by a recourse to one 
form or the other of old-style, cost-based rules, the most significant one being Areeda and Turner’s 
1975 average variable cost rule.21 The point is that none of these rules managed to effectively 
counter the gist of McGee’s argument, namely, that there seemed to be no business rationale for the 
predation strategy in the first place. The dispute was eventually settled by the Supreme Court 
which, in the famous 1986 Matsushita case, embraced the Chicago story and concluded that 
“…predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful” and that “mistaken 
inferences in cases like this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect”. Thus, “[i]f the factual context renders respondents’ claims 
                                                 
21
 According to which a price below reasonably anticipated average variable cost (used as a proxy of unobservable 
marginal cost) should be presumed unlawful in court (Areeda and Turner 1975, 733). For a brief survey of other rules, 
see McGee 1980, 304-320. 
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implausible – if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense – respondents must come 
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be 
necessary…”22 Nails in the coffin of predatory pricing, one might be tempted to say. 
However, starting from the late 1970s game theory has offered some convincing explanations of 
why predatory pricing may, after all, be a sound, profit-maximizing business behavior. As remarked 
by Motta (2004, 415-6), the common thread in recent models of predation is that such a behavior 
may be explained only in a context of imperfect/incomplete information, that is, when players have 
some uncertainty. The key idea is that the predator may try to exploit the prey’s less-than-perfect 
knowledge (or that of the outside investors who finance it) and thus behave so that to make the rival 
believe that no profits can be made in that industry. As a result, either the prey will exit the market, 
or a potential entrant will abstain from entering, or its lenders will not be willing to provide the 
necessary funds. For this manipulation of beliefs to be possible, it is necessary that some 
uncertainty exist: in a market where all firms have perfect knowledge, McGee’s argument is correct 
and no predation would ever be observed because everybody knows beforehand either that the 
predator will be successful in its strategy to exclude the rival, who therefore will never costly 
challenge the incumbent, or that predation will be unsuccessful and thus will never be tried in the 
first place. Thus, what we have here is an instance of a real life business behavior which is simply 
inexplicable in a simple perfect information context and which can only find a rationale – and the 
related possibility of condemnation – in the richer analytical setup of imperfect/incomplete games.  
Modern, game-theoretic models of predation can be divided into three broad categories: 
reputation models, signalling models and financial market models. All date back, in their first 
versions, to the late 1970s – early 1980s and all share a common tool-box, whose key components 
are, on the one side, Harsanyi’s setup for games of incomplete information and, on the other, the 
equilibrium concepts of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and sequential equilibrium. Let me 
briefly exemplify this literature by referring to one of its most famous papers, namely, Kreps and 
Wilson 1982a.23  
The key idea is that a price war today may find its rationale in the attempt to create a reputation 
of being a strong and aggressive incumbent to discourage future entry. Selten’s chain store paradox 
(Selten 1978) had demonstrated that, in case of an entry game, the application of backward 
induction leads the entrant to always enter and be accommodated by the incumbent, regardless of 
the (finite) number of times the game is played. Hence, no predation would ever occur in such a 
game. Note that Selten’s result bode ill for the success of game theory: once more, a logically 
                                                 
22
 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The quotations are at pp. 589, 594 and 587. 
23
 Other classic papers are Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Benoit 1984, Saloner 1987. Here I follow once more Motta 
2004, 416-8. 
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impeccable game-theoretic reasoning, this time in the form of subgame perfect equilibrium, entailed 
an implausible description of real world behavior – a result that Selten himself deemed paradoxical 
as he acknowledged that the desire to build a reputation of toughness capable of deterring further 
entry seemed to provide a good reason for real world incumbents to prey on entrants. Kreps and 
Wilson simply introduced some uncertainty on the incumbent’s type (i.e., whether weak or strong) 
and proved that this sufficed to show that predation would occur in a PBE.  
Assume there is some probability that the incumbent is not weak. A strong incumbent would 
fight entry by setting a low price: yet, this is not predatory behavior, but just a (Chicago-style) 
manifestation of the incumbent’s competitive edge. The key issue, however, is that now a weak 
incumbent also has an incentive to fight entry by setting a low price: this in order to make the 
potential future entrants believe the incumbent is a strong one and thus they had better avoid entry. 
But setting a low price is precisely an instance of predatory behavior: a weak incumbent, in fact, is 
deemed to lose money from such a low price and its losses can only be justified in view of, and 
recouped thanks to, the deterrence of future entries. Kreps and Wilson’s main insight is clear-cut: 
even a small departure from perfect information might justify predatory pricing in a finite, but long 
enough, horizon. 
The modern literature on predation is now a standard feature of any intermediate industrial 
economics textbook. From the historian’s viewpoint, one may hardly downplay the role played in 
this literature by Robert Wilson and his students/colleagues at Stanford Graduate School of 
Business (GSB).24 If we pay attention to the fact that Wilson himself has been taught Bayesian 
decision theory, as a PhD student in the early 1960s, by no less than Howard Raiffa at Harvard 
Business School,25 our story comes full circle. Harvard’s SCP approach, epitomized by the standard 
predation story, had clear interventionist implications from the viewpoint of antitrust policy. Both 
the approach and, later, its policy implications suffered a setback when the efficiency arguments of 
the Chicago school made their way in the literature and, later, in courts. In the case of predation, 
these arguments simply claimed that there were no business motivations supporting it. Yet, starting 
from the 1980s, the rationale underlying old per se prohibitions has been rescued by those game 
theorists, such as Wilson and the other Stanford GSB scholars, who have applied Bayesian 
techniques to a long list of business behaviors, including predatory pricing. These were the 
                                                 
24
 The impact of Bob Wilson (at Stanford GSB since 1964) in the development of game theory would deserve a deeper 
investigation, as is apparent by even a quick glance at the list of those who have been his students, colleagues, or both. 
To name just a few, Paul Milgrom (PhD Stanford 1979), John Roberts (at Stanford since 1980), Peter Hammond (at 
Stanford from 1979 to 2007), David Kreps (PhD Stanford 1975), Jean-Pierre Benoit (PhD Stanford 1983), Garth 
Saloner (PhD Stanford 1982), Claude d’Aspremont (PhD Stanford 1973), Alvin Roth (PhD Stanford 1974), Bengt 
Holmstrom (PhD Stanford 1978),  Bob Rosenthal (PhD Stanford 1969). Some information on Bob Wilson’s influence 
can be found in the 2002 Festschrift Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson available at www.bepress.com/wilson 
25
 On Raiffa’s role in the diffusion Bayesian decision theory see the interview in Feinberg 2008. 
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techniques which Wilson had learned at Harvard and which had been first extended to game theory 
at the turn of the 1970s by Harsanyi and the other ACDA people. From here, it is rather tempting to 
conclude that one of the crucial factors explaining the 1980s explosion of game theory might have 
been the opportunity to rehabilitate Harvard’s SCP approach and its policy implications, as a 
reaction against the laissez-faire, hands-off approach to antitrust of the Chicago school. This of 
course does not necessarily mean that game theorists were urging a return to pre-1970s antitrust 
policies and practices, nor that the rise of the so-called post-Chicago approach to industrial economics 
was the deliberate outcome of a precise policy view. Indeed, apart from the elegant generalizations of 
old results, the concrete (i.e., judicial) effect of the new literature has often been meager.26 My point 
here is simply that, while in its first three decades of life game theory had been held back by a lack of 
useful applications, the opportunity to use Harsanyi and co.’s methods and results in such a prominent 
field like competition theory and policy did open a new era where game theory scholars could profitably 
(even in a literal sense…) apply their expertise, thereby effectively promoting the discipline’s diffusion.  
 
 
§3. Mechanism design problems 
 
Mechanism design theory (MDT henceforth) provides a unified framework for analyzing the great 
variety of institutions (such as markets and firms) which allocate economic resources, with an 
emphasis on incentives and private information and the goal of identifying optimal institutions. 
More specifically, a mechanism is a specification of how economic decisions are determined as a 
function of the information that is known by individuals in the economy. The basic insight of MDT 
is that incentive constraints should be considered as important as resource constraints in the 
formulation of any economic problem. In every situation where individuals have private 
information and may perform hard-to-monitor actions, agents must be given the proper incentives to 
share their information and exert the due efforts. MDT tells us that the need to provide those 
incentives may impose constraints on the economic system whose relevance is no lower than that of 
traditional scarcity constraints.  
The previous summary corresponds to a modern view of a “mechanism” and of MDT (in fact, it is 
taken from Myerson 1989). In his 1960 seminal work, Leonid Hurwicz defined a mechanism simply 
as a communication system in which participants send messages to each other and to a message 
center, and where a pre-specified rule assigns an outcome, like an allocation of goods, for every 
collection of messages received (Hurwicz 1960). Such a definition naturally led 1960s researchers 
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 The Chicago approach is still predominant in antitrust courts, especially in the US: see Martin 2007; Page 2008. 
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to emphasize the “cost side” of mechanisms, i.e., how to design an efficient mechanism from the 
viewpoint of informational and computational costs. Incentive issues came to the fore only in 1972, 
following Hurwicz’s second seminal contribution, which first formulated the notion of incentive-
compatibility (Hurwicz 1972), thus paving the way to the modern analysis of mechanisms where 
self-interested agents are endowed with private information. A mechanism is incentive-compatible 
if it is a dominant strategy for each participant to report her private information truthfully. In 
addition, every agent must be willing to participate to the mechanism, that is, participation should 
not make her worse off. Notably, Hurwicz 1972 demonstrated a negative result, namely, that in a 
standard exchange economy no incentive-compatible mechanism satisfying the participation 
constraint can produce Pareto-optimal outcome. In other words, the existence of private information 
precludes the attainment of economic efficiency.27  
As is well known, MDT may exhibit a very noble origin. The idea of institutions as means to 
communicate widely dispersed information, as well as that of comparing different institutions 
according to their ability to work as communication mechanisms, date back to the 1930s great 
socialist calculation controversy and, in particular, to Hayek’s contribution to the debate.28 The 
young Leonid Hurwicz was among the mathematical economists who took Hayek by his word and 
tried to build a general framework for analyzing the different institutions as mechanisms for 
coordinating the behavior of individuals in a society. In short, MDT represents no less than the most 
mature version of the economists’ more-than-two-century long inquiry into the problem of resource 
allocation.  
But, what has all this to do with the 1980s boom of game theory? The answer is, quite a lot. As 
early as 1980, in their JEL survey on the discipline’s latest developments, Andrew Schotter and 
Gerhard Schwödiauer identified Hurwicz’s problem and approach as one of the three, 
institutionally-oriented sources of the new surge of interest in game theory.29 Generally speaking, 
MDT defines institutions as noncooperative games and compares different institutions in terms of 
the equilibrium outcomes of these games. Following Hurwicz’s notion of incentive compatibility, 
and in view of his 1972 negative result, it came indeed natural to other economists to ask whether 
Pareto optimality could be attained by considering a wider class of mechanisms than exchange 
economies and by imposing game-theoretic equilibrium concepts less demanding than the dominant 
strategy one. Moreover, it was rather straightforward to generalize Hurwicz’s MDT problem to the 
question of what kind of mechanism would maximize any given objective function, be it a profit or 
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 For an assessment of Hurwicz’s contribution to MDT see Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2007; Myerson 2007.  
28
 See e.g. Hayek 1945. 
29
 The other two being social choice literature, which today would be classified within MDT, and Martin Shubik’s  
general equilibrium analysis with price-making agents, which on the contrary has had little impact in the following 
years (see Schotter and Schwödiauer 1980, 480-1). 
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a social welfare one. Interpreted in the latter sense, the range of potential applications of MDT 
became practically boundless: to name just a few, MDT has been applied to issues such as the 
provision of public goods, the design of auctions and public procurements or the regulation of 
monopolists, and has led to a radical reinterpretation of entire sub-fields, such as firm theory or 
social choice theory.     
The landmark moment for the general applicability of MDT came in the 1970s with the 
formulation of the revelation principle. The principle states that, for any general coordination 
mechanism, any equilibrium of rational communication strategies for economic agents can be 
simulated by an equivalent incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism (DRM), where a 
trustworthy mediator maximally centralizes communication and makes honesty and obedience 
rational equilibrium strategies for the agents (Myerson 2008a). A DRM is a special kind of 
mechanism where a mediator is assumed to exist who can communicate separately and 
confidentially with every agent in the economy. Each individual is asked to report all his private 
information to the mediator who, in her turn, after receiving the reports, confidentially recommend 
some action to each individual. Any rule specifying how the mediator’s recommendations are 
determined as a function of the reports received is a DRM (Myerson 1989; 2008a). A DRM is said 
to be incentive-compatible if honesty in reporting to the mediator and obedience to the latter’s 
recommendation is an equilibrium strategy for each individual. Usually, an incentive-compatible 
DRM can be formulated in terms of a system of linear inequalities which makes it a simple and 
intuitive mathematical object. Of course, a DRM is an ideal mechanism, with no real world 
counterpart. Yet, the crucial insight of the revelation principle is that for any equilibrium of any 
general mechanism, there is an equivalent incentive-compatible DRM. This entails that, by limiting 
our analysis to mathematically handy incentive-compatible DRM, we can characterize the outcome 
of every possible equilibrium of every possible realistic mechanism with no loss of generality. 
Thus, thanks to the revelation principle the analyst may deal with seemingly intractable problems of 
mechanism design under conditions of private information by simply investigating the properties of 
the set of linear inequalities of the corresponding incentive-compatible DRM.   
The revelation principle has been first formulated by Gibbard 1973 who followed Hurwicz in the 
use of dominant strategies as equilibrium concept. The decisive step forward came at the end of the 
1970s when several researchers (Holmstrom 1977; Rosenthal 1978; Dasgupta, Hammond and 
Maskin 1979; Myerson 1979) independently re-formulated the principle, in the case of a purely 
informational problem (i.e., adverse selection), applying a broader solution concept, Bayesian Nash 
 17 
equilibrium.30 In the case of a pure moral hazard problem the principle had been already developed 
in Aumann’s 1974 theory of correlated equilibrium. The much-awaited synthesis, i.e., the revelation 
principle for general Bayesian games with incomplete information with both hidden information 
and hidden action, came with Myerson 1982. Thus, in a few years the key results of MDT were 
fully derived and this took place in the context of Bayesian games and with the use of Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium as solution concept. Since then, mechanism design problems have always been 
formulated in Bayesian terms, that is, according to the modeling strategy first envisioned by John 
Harsanyi.   
 What we have here is a third, very convincing, answer to the question “why the game theory 
boom?”. The exceptional width of applications of MDT and the circumstance that the latter has 
never been separated, since the late 1970s, from Bayesian game theory speak by themselves. Every 
economist wishing to contribute to MDT – that is, to any issue in modern microeconomics having 
to do with private information – had first to learn how to model and solve a Bayesian game. This 
simple truth is epitomized by what is commonly considered the first intermediate microeconomics 
manual entirely built around game-theoretic notions, namely, David Kreps’s 1990 A Course in 
Microeconomic Theory. What may be found in the third and fourth parts of the manual, after ten 
initial chapters covering standard material, is a sub-course in game theory and information 
economics which carries the reader step-by-step towards a glorious finale in Chapter 18, dedicated 
to “The revelation principle and mechanism design”. In short, by 1990 the time was ripe for the 
author of a successful handbook to make economics students aware, first, that the core of modern 
microeconomics lay in Bayesian game theory and, second, that what game theory was for was the 
design of mechanisms. 
Three final remarks on this section. First, it is a nice irony of the history of game theory that the 
discipline’s vindication and eventual triumph came from applying its tools to institutional design 
and analysis. As is well known, a deep interest in institutions was in fact among the main themes 
and motivations of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games (see e.g. von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1953, 41, 43).31 Second, among the fields where MDT has been applied we find 
industrial organization. For example, Baron and Myerson 1982 is considered the foundational paper 
for the modern analysis of monopoly regulation. This may lead us to conclude that the distinction 
between our second and third explanation is somehow blurred, since many of the 1980s 
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 Note that, while the authors correctly identified the relation between mechanism design and noncooperative theory, 
the classic survey by Schotter and Schwödiauer hardly mentioned John Harsanyi and Bayesian equilibrium as the focus 
was just on either dominant strategy or Nash solutions (see Schotter and Schwödiauer 1980, 480-1, 493 ff.).    
31
 Also see Schotter and Schwödiauer 1980, 481-2; Giocoli 2000. Once more, the role played by the sheer transition 
from von Neumann’s difficult and largely inconclusive cooperative approach to Nash’s simpler and more effective 
noncooperative program should never be forgotten: see above, fn.4.  
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contributions to competition economics which applied Bayesian game theory to provide a rationale 
for some anti-competitive business behaviors were actually developed within the broad context of 
MDT. This is apparent when we acknowledge that several of the protagonists of MDT (such as 
Milgrom, Roberts, Holmstrom, Rosenthal and Kreps) came from Stanford GSB which, as we saw in 
§3, was also central to the anti-Chicago reaction. Yet, and here is my last remark, if we look at the 
research center which provided the impulse for the development of MDT two places, other than 
Stanford, should feature prominently: the University of Minnesota and Northwestern University in 
Chicago.32 The former was Hurwicz’s home and an obvious formation center for mechanism-
oriented economists. The latter was home of the Managerial Economics and Decision Science 
(MEDS) department at Kellogg School of Management. There, under the leadership of Stanley 
Reiter, himself a student of Hurwicz,33 the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and 
Management Science (CMS-EMS) was created in 1971 to bring together economists, 
mathematicians, and social scientists who used mathematical methods and models. As may be read 
from the CMS-EMS website: <<A major focus of research at the Center has been the use of game 
theory in the analysis and design of systems, organizations, and institutions for managing and 
regulating economic and political activities>>34. Even a casual look at the list of the CMS-EMS 
Discussion Papers (all available on line) in the late 1970s – early 1980s, plus the names of the 
economists who worked at MEDS in the same period (Myerson, Milgrom, Holmstrom, Roberts, 
John Ledyard,  Mark Satterthwaite), reveals the major role played by Reiter and the MEDS in the 
development and spread of both game theory and MDT. It is a safe bet to foresee that future works 
in the history of modern microeconomics will have to focus on the events going on at MEDS.   
 
 
§4. Conclusion: a clear protagonist and a missing ingredient 
 
Which of the three suggested explanations (refinements, antitrust, mechanism design) is then the 
motive behind the 1980s boom of game theory? Note that the real action in all three cases began in 
the last third of the 1970s, so much so that sheer chronology is of little help to discriminate among 
them. My own views have changed through time, moving from the first, to the second, to (more 
recently) the third explanation, but the real answer is that the question is purely rhetorical since the 
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 With the possible addition of Harvard, where two of the 2007 Nobelists for MDT, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson, 
earned their PhD (both in 1976) under the supervision of Kenneth Arrow, who worked there from 1968 to 1979, before 
returning to Stanford, and who, among his many co-authorship with Leo Hurwicz, published in 1977 the volume 
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes (Arrow and Hurwicz 1977).  
33
 Reiter earned his PhD in 1955, at the University of Chicago, under the supervision of Hurwicz. 
34
 See www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math 
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most correct assessment is that the game-theoretic revolution of neoclassical economics has been 
caused by a combination of the three. And if one still insists in requiring that a weight be assigned 
to the three explanations, the solution can only be found in a quantitative analysis to be performed 
searching the JSTOR and similar databases. Thus, my concluding remarks are not dedicated to 
arguing in favor of one explanation or the other. What I’d rather do is to underline who is, to my 
view, the common, and undisputed, hero of all the three narratives and to highlight the important 
piece of information that is still missing in order to complete our story. 
The common hero is, little surprise at that, John Harsanyi. As I have argued at length above, his 
1967-68 three-part paper lies at the foundation of practically everything that goes today under the 
headline of modern game theory. The sense of sincere reverence and admiration transpiring from 
the writings that the prominent game theorist and 2007 Nobel winner Roger Myerson has dedicated 
to Harsanyi bears witness to the latter’s achievement. Hence, having paid due tribute to John von 
Neumann and John Nash as the revered founding fathers of the discipline, it is not an exaggeration 
to claim that the single most important character in the post-1950s history of game theory has been 
the 1994 Hungarian Nobelist – a figure who, unfortunately, still awaits a full-fledged intellectual 
biography capable of embracing both his adventurous life and the depth of his scientific 
contributions.  
The missing piece of information can be summarized in a very simple question: how, when and 
why did Bayesian rationality become the kind of rationality attributed to economic agents in 
mainstream economic models? As I have argued in Giocoli 2003, the history of how 20th-century 
economists have characterized the rational agents populating their models is quite complicated. 
Among the unsolved puzzles, features that of understanding how Bayesian decision-making, which 
Leonard Savage had proposed in the early 1950s as a criterion for teaching his colleague 
statisticians how to draw the most correct inferences from their data (Savage 1954), could turn out 
being a substantial failure in statistics (where most statisticians happily stuck to the classical 
inferential techniques Savage so openly criticized) and, at the same time, an enormous success in 
economics. When did rational economic agents become Bayesian decision makers? The question is 
clearly crucial for our story because the popularity of Harsanyi’s game theory could never 
materialize without Bayesian rationality having already entered the tool-box of a sufficient number 
of mainstream economists. The fact that rationality considerations could be explicitly extended, in 
Harsanyi’s setup, to cover each player’s beliefs about the rivals’ beliefs about herself, or, in other 
words, that players could be modeled as capable of also theorizing, according to rationality criteria, 
on the other players’ thought processes, was very far from granted.  
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Central to Bayesian game theory is the double assumption that rational players i) quantify via 
subjective probability distributions all the uncertainty they face, including the actions and beliefs of 
other players, and ii) maximize their utilities subject to these distributions. But this is something 
that, to make just a name, John von Neumann would have never accepted, as he time and again 
denied that agents in a game might perform the first activity, let alone the second one. Subjective 
probability itself was an instrument conspicuously absent from the tool-box of ordinary postwar 
economists, regardless of de Finetti’s and Ramsey’s 1930s efforts. Even the success enjoyed by 
Abraham Wald’s “games against nature” as a useful technique for dealing with uncertain decision 
environments when no objective probability distribution is available (see Wald 1950) shows the 
distance separating postwar social science from the Bayesian approach. And still, Harsanyi’s work 
did find fertile ground in the late 1960s – early 1970s, so much so that it managed to trigger the 
game-theoretic revolution. Who had fertilized the Bayesian fields in the previous decade or so?  
I have no answer to this crucial question, but a possible research line should, to my view, look at 
management studies and business schools. Two clues and a general remark lead towards this 
direction. The clues are, first, the fact that a giant of contemporary game theory like Bob Wilson 
could learn his Bayesian skills under Howard Raiffa at Harvard Business School, and, second, the 
fact that Harsanyi’s paper was published not in Econometrica, but in Management Science, hardly 
the obvious outlet for a highly theoretical piece of economic analysis. The general remark is that the 
stone guest of the whole history of postwar neoclassical economics, namely, operations research, 
featured in management Ph.D. programs much more prominently than in economics ones. And, of 
course, statistical decision theory was a crucial ingredient in operations research teaching. In a 
nutshell, I believe that a further, interesting question is the following one: did the Bayesian 
revolution in game and decision theory come to economics from business, rather than statistical, 
studies? The (in)famous “five-minute science” eagerly awaits its small revenge… 
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